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Abstract
Air transport has evolved into a safe infrastructure due to a comprehensive set of safety
standards covering all relevant aspects of flying. However, each standard has evolved
independently and imposes specific, historically motivated, requirements that are not
necessarily compatible.
New challenges arise, such as punctuality and cost consciousness. General information
technology trends, such as COTS and network-centric solutions, offer new opportunities
to improve responsiveness and reduce time-to-market.
The applicable air transport software safety standards for a specific integrated system
are discussed. A comparison is made with software safety standards from the process,
nuclear and medical industry, focussing on lessons-learned.
The air transport case illustrates the need for and an opportunity to innovate software
safety standardisation and certification and provides guidance for such standard
innovation.
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1 Introduction
A century after the first powered flight, air transport has evolved into a safe infrastructure
connecting all places around the globe. Air transport safety standards have evolved into a
comprehensive set, covering all relevant aspects of flying. Incident and accident investigations
focussing on lessons learnt instead of apportioning blame contribute to a self-improving safety
system. The impressive air transport safety record testifies to the success of this approach.
However, each standard has evolved independently and imposes specific, historically motivated,
requirements, which are not necessarily compatible.
The transformation of air transport from a privilege of the few into a mass-market commodity
imposes new challenges such as punctuality and cost consciousness while at the same time
reinforcing the need for continuous safety improvements. General Information Technology (IT)
trends such as deploying Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and network enabling
of existing systems offer new opportunities to improve responsiveness, reduce time-to-market
for new passenger services such as in-flight e-mail, and to improve the quality of passenger
service by seamless airport check-in procedures, etc.
The nature of air transport implies that the supporting services have to be world-wide
interoperable i.e. need to be standardised. The resulting global competition requires a uniform
interpretation of these standards and resulting certificates to prevent safety degradation from
occurring in specific nations, the unwanted equivalent of cheap flag countries for ships.
Chapter one provides some background on the integrated air transport system. This integrated
system, also referenced as a system-of-systems, illustrates the various applicable air transport
software safety standards that are discussed in the subsequent chapter. In order to learn from
other domains, an overview from the safety standards of the process, nuclear and medical
industry is provided in the next chapter. Differing approaches or incompatible requirements of
these standards, which aim for similar safety objectives, will be highlighted, resulting in a
number of recommendations for software safety standards. For COTS to be viable, a safety
product needs to be allowed to operate in these differing domains without undue additional
certification effort per domain, i.e. the common safety objectives should result in mutually
recognised standards and certificates.
Recently heightened security concerns provide an opportunity to apply a security standard to the
same integrated system. A dedicated chapter describes this standard’s approach, providing
further material for the conclusions in the closing chapter.
-6-
NLR-TP-2003-378
2 Air transport case description
2.1 Current practise
Currently the various aircraft systems are highly integrated to optimise the aircraft flight within
the applicable safety limits. However, as aircraft are not connected to ground-based air traffic
management systems, other then via an old-fashioned voice link between pilot and air traffic
controller, this optimisation does not take into account the other traffic.
The justification of Air Traffic Management (ATM) is to prevent collisions between aircraft.
Aircraft operate in conditions (e.g. flying through clouds) where the pilots can not do this
themselves. Traditionally air traffic management is a national responsibility, where use of civil
airspace and airports is optimised to achieve maximum traffic flow within national constraints
like military airspace.
As in any safety-related industry, both aircraft and air traffic management systems tend to have
a conservative approach to innovation. These systems are custom made for a very small market,
compared to the general domain, resulting in comparatively low investment and a
correspondingly low innovation rate. Strict domain-specific safety rules prevent the use of
Commercial off-the-Shelf (COTS) software, reducing the innovation rate even further.
Currently the design of a new aircraft, like the Airbus A380, or the Joint Strike Fighter, is a
major effort that takes well over a decade from initial idea to a flying and certified product.
Even on the ground, Air Traffic Management systems take a similar time to produce and get
operational.
Airlines fly aircraft within the limits set by the aircraft and the airspace, optimising for
commercial profit. As a result their automated support systems posses yet other information and
optimise for different objectives.
National authorities are responsible for the environment by limiting noise, emissions, third party
risk etc. This is yet another perspective, yielding different information and information systems.
2.2 New concepts
In busy airspace the current way of working is approaching its limits, resulting in safe but
uneconomical flight execution with delays on the ground and in the air. To improve this
situation in the COOPATS (Co-operative Air Traffic Services) concept [EUROCONTROL,
2000] concept has been conceived. Co-operative Air Traffic Services combine global satellite
based position services with global satellite based communication services and terrestrial air
traffic management. COOPATS’s high-level objective is to support air traffic controllers, pilots,
and all potential ATM users, in all phases of flight by progressively implementing fully
seamless communication, data exchange and automation capabilities. The key principle is
improved situational awareness for both pilot and controller, enabled by intelligent systems.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed services per flight phase.
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Figure 1: Co-operative Air Traffic Services concept
2.3 Service example
In order to illustrate the kind of optimisation that the Co-operative Air Traffic Services concept
aims to support, the pilot-oriented sample service of figure 2 is described.
Figure 2 Pilot-oriented sample service
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At an airport the pilot information-needs are time dependent. A co-ordinated pushback service
will allow the pilot to improve the reliability of on-time pushback. The pilot needs amalgamated
information from, e.g., fuelling services, baggage-handling services, catering services, security
services, gate personnel and Airline Operations Centre (AOC) about transfer passengers. This
pushback service optimises utilisation of the taxi-way linking the various gates and prevents
aircraft from blocking each other or ending up in the wrong take-off order. Subsequently
taxi-services guide the aircraft to the correct runway, optimised for the other airfield traffic, its
departure timeslot and taking possibly adverse weather or airfield maintenance restrictions into
account. Finally, runway incursion services, using surveillance services, improve the safety
during take-off.
2.4 TALIS solution
The TALIS (Total Information Sharing for Pilot Situational Awareness Enhanced by Intelligent
Systems) project provides a supporting architecture for the Co-operative Air Traffic Services
concept and its innovative services. Furthermore the TALIS architecture should integrate the
existing systems of yet other actors like the authorities. The authorities are responsible to
determine capacity, regulate and monitor collision risk, noise, emissions and third party risk.
The TALIS architecture provides the middleware to integrate the existing systems. By
combining the strengths of the individually provided services the time-to-market for new
services can be reduced significantly and competitiveness can be increased resulting in better
service at lower costs. Figure 3 provides an overview of the TALIS architecture. [Kesseler,
2003] contains more information on TALIS.
Figure 3: TALIS architecture
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For the various systems and services depicted in figure 3 different safety standards apply, which
are discussed in the next chapter. Some [Jensen, 2003] even state that modernising the ATM
infrastructure would be relatively easy. The certification process poses the major problem.
3 Air transport safety standards
All discussed standards share the notion that software has to be classified according to the
system hazards (loss of life, aircraft damage) the software failure would cause or contribute to.
This information is obtained from the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) plus the (Preliminary)
System Safety Assessment (P)SSA. Based on this information, the software will be classified.
For each software class a number of standard specific requirements have to be satisfied.
Usually, an independent authority checks compliance with the requirements and approves
complying products as fit for use. This paper will concentrate on the software part.
3.1 Airborne software safety standard DO-178B/ED12
For all software in an aircraft [DO-178B, 1992] applies. As one of the oldest software safety
standards it influenced other software safety standards. Based on the system level FAR/JAR
AC-25-1309 the following five software levels are defined by DO-178B. For convenience in
Table 1 the quantified FAR/JAR failure-probability definition is included.
Level System failure Failure description Probability
description
FAR/JAR definition
per flight hour
A Catastrophic failure Aircraft loss and/or fatalities Extremely improbable           .. < 10-9
B Hazardous / Severe
major
Flight crew can not perform their tasks
Serious or fatal injuries to some occupants
Extremely remote 10-9 < .. < 10-7
C Major failure Workload impairs flight crew efficiency
Occupant discomfort including injuries
Remote 10-7 < .. < 10-5
D Minor failure Workload within flight crew capabilities
Some inconvenience to occupants
Probable 10-5 < ..
E No effect No effect Not applicable -
Table 1: DO178B/ED12 overview
Detailed requirements are provided for each level. As it is not possible to measure actual failure
rates at the required low rates, strict process guidance is provided. Complying with this process
is considered sufficient. The excellent air transport safety record up to date does not repudiate
this assumption. Many consider DO-178B as the toughest standard in industry.
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Figure 4: Overview of airborne safety standard DO-178B
Figure 4 provides an overview of the DO-178B software development and certification process.
DO-178B has an abstract lifecycle defining four generic phases (software requirements process,
software design process, software coding process and software integration process). A
developer must map its software processes onto those required by DO-178B. This is described
in a special document called the Plan of Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC). This
document should be negotiated between the developer and certifying authorities prior to actual
software development. Subsequently, the developer needs only to comply with the agreed
PSAC document.
DO-178B specifies 66 detailed requirements for the four software development processes
complemented by the software planning process and integral processes. For each level the
applicability of each requirements is defined, with all required for level A.
Industry standards define the functions that must exist in certain avionics units (e.g., flight
management system). Developers can further enhance such units with client-based
requirements. Consequently, most avionics units are custom made, though the mandating of
core functionality does provide a basis for reuse.
To date, there is usually only one software application assigned to a hardware unit, although the
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) industry standard will allow several fixed and pre-defined
applications to run on a single hardware unit. This illustrates how DO-178B trails current real-
time and embedded systems development practices.
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are officially allowed by DO-178B, however, no
requirements are waived. Consequently, only COTS products that have been developed
specifically taking all DO-178B requirements into account can be used. Note that navigation
services like [WAAS, 2003], [EGNOS, 2003], [MSAS, 2003] and the European Galileo effort,
all take DO-178B into account but deviate on details. These deviations are predicated upon cost-
benefit analyses, in that various requirements may be more expensive than justified by the
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relative usage of the navigation service by a particular domain. These deviations must be shown
to the conservative certifying authority not to materially distract from the safety goals of
DO-178B.
Certification involving new software techniques such as object-orientation tends to be
troublesome for the first applicant trying to certify its use since DO-178B tends to trail the
current state-of-the-art in embedded software engineering. The first applicant bears the full
burden to convince the justifiable conservative certifying authorities.
Certification is required from each nation where an airline wants to acquire an aircraft for civil
use. Airbus has obtained its initial 13 type certifications over the last 10 years from the
European Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), complemented by another 13 from the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) plus 130 from other nations. Boeing obtained 200 additional
certificates in the same period, after the initial FAA certification [Holderbach, 2001].
Substantial benefits can be accrued when each nation accepts the certifications of all accredited
ICAO member states. A system of accreditation should enforce equal enforcement of the
standard in all nations concerned. Currently mutual certification recognition involves a lengthy
negotiation between the two certifying authorities involved, leading to a bilateral agreement. Air
transport’s good safety record does not repudiate the claim that DO-178B compliance provides
the safety objectives. However catastrophic failures (level A) are fortunately so rare, that the
absence of software induced catastrophic failures does not statistically justify DO-178B claims.
Like all other software safety standards, evidence on the utility of effectiveness of each of the
66 requirements is lacking. They are based on a consensus on engineering judgement.
3.2 Airborne software safety standard DO-278B/ED109
For Air Traffic Management (ATM) ground (and satellite) systems, the USA has produced a
new standard [DO-278, 2002] by extending DO-178B. Table 2 provides an overview of the six
Assurance Levels (AL) defined in DO-278. Note that unlike DO-178B, neither a definition of
the assurance levels nor an indication of the allowed failure probability is provided. DO-278
adds an assurance level by splitting level C. DO-178B added an level by splitting level II from it
predecessor DO-178A into level B and C. Consequently any software safety standards should
provide sufficient grading.
In contrast to DO-178B, DO-278 acknowledges the use of independently developed (pre-
existing) COTS, by defining processes for planning, acquisition, verification, configuration
management and quality assurance. It must be demonstrated that unused COTS capabilities do
not adversely effect the ATM system. An important extension to DO-178B is that COTS service
experience may be used, thereby obviating the need to apply a DO-278 compliant development
process for some assurance levels. However, the restrictions on service experience are quite
severe. The information on service experience is included in Table 2. In the table, “one year”
means that for a continuous period of 8760 hours of representative use no failure may occur.
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Additionally, all in-service reports originating from all users of the COTS have to be evaluated
for their potential adverse effects on the ATM system.
DO-178 level DO-278 assurance level COTS service experience
A AL 1 Not allowed
B AL 2 Negotiate with approval authority
C AL 3 One year
AL 4 Six months
D AL 5 Typically not needed
E AL 6 Not applicable
Table 2: DO-278/ED109 overview
3.3 EUROCONTROL Recommendations for Air Navigation Services
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) has produced
the Recommendations for Air Navigation Services (ANS) [EUROCONTROL, 2003]. These
recommendations combine DO-178B, IEC-61508, and the Capability Maturity Model [Paulk,
1993] into a combined safety and quality assurance document. The software classification is
provided in Table 3. The classification is based on the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory
Requirement [ESARR 4, 2003], while inserting an additional level identical to Level B of
DO-178B. The requirements on the evidence that needs to be provided depend on the assurance
level. The standard also covers operational use and maintenance phase, a useful extension to
DO-178B.
Software
assurance
level
ESARR4 severity
(Class, effect)
ESARR 4
occurrence
likelihood
software occurrence likelihood
(operational-hour)
1a 1 Accidents Improbable N/A
1b DO-178B level B N/A DO-178B Extremely Remote
10-9 < .. < 10-7
2 2 Serious incidents Remote 10-6 < ... < 10-5
3 3 Major incidents Occasional 10-5 < ... < 10-4
4 4 Significant incidents Probable 10-4 < ... < 10-3
5 5 No immediate effect on
safety
N/A N/A
Table 3: EUROCONTROL EATMP software assurance levels
3.4 Electronic Flight Bag AC120-76A
The electronic flight bag is a COTS-based hardware platform that supports many independent
software applications, possibly even simultaneously. As such the electronic flight bag is well
suited for the airborne part of the TALIS system. The electronic flight bag can be part of the
aircraft and so DO-178B applies. However, it can also be used outside the aircraft, so a special
document on the safety and certification [AC120-76A, 2003] is available. The electronic flight
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bag could either be a portable device like a slate laptop or personal digital assistant, or be
installed in the aircraft.
The electronic flight bag software is classified as:
• Type A: applications that include pre-composed, fixed presentations of aviation data. Type
A software needs Flight Standards District Office (FDSO) approval. 71 example
applications are provided;
• Type B: applications that include dynamic applications that interactively manipulate and
present aviation data. Type B software additionally needs evaluation by the Aircraft
Evaluation Group. AC120-76A lists 17 applications. A six-month operational evaluation is
needed, during which a (paper) back-up of the application is required.
• Type C: all other applications. Full DO-178B approval is needed.
All user-modifiable software is type C. Consequently a key TALIS requirement like
dynamically uploading applications remains cumbersome. Positive is the guidance provided on
usability or human factors.
Compliance to AC120-76A implies compliance to 103 sections of 5 parts of the US Code of
Federal Regulation (CFR) relating to airworthiness plus 45 additional sections of 4 parts of the
operating regulations plus 20 advisory circulars plus 10 other FAA regulations. Even within
AC120-76A, some parts relate to activities performed only once for the approval of software,
while other parts mention an operational approval valid for a specific operator for six months.
This profusion of standards, regulations, etc, is typical for integrated systems like TALIS.
Consequently, there is a need for a different approach to certification, which ensures the safety,
but omits the many un-harmonised standards. Note that possible different national
interpretations further complicate certification without increasing safety.
3.5 ESA DRD 920, a DO-178B based standard
For the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System description (EGNOS) programme,
the European Space Agency (ESA) has produced a specific standard that combines the standard
European space quality assurance practises PSS05 with DO-178B, [DRD 920, 1999]. DRD 920
addresses issues arising from the use of subcontractors and the reuse of existing software.
Interestingly, ESA acts both as customer as well as certifying authority. Consequently, for
EGNOS additional certification activities need to be performed once EGNOS becomes
operational in any ESA member state.
An annex to DRD 920 provides the PSAC (Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, a DO-
178B required document). The annex states that forty DO-178B requirements are satisfied by
the standard, while a further three are partially satisfied, twenty-six are not satisfied and for four
requirements the status is unclear. For the unsatisfied requirements the contractor has to comply
by other means. Human Machine Interface testing and specialised tools are specifically
mentioned by DRD 920.
-14-
NLR-TP-2003-378
Procured software is approved by ESA. For COTS software “certification material” is needed to
satisfy the DO-178B objectives. If modifications of reused software exceed 20% of the code, it
is considered new code. A virus check for COTS is required, merging safety and security
concerns.
An idealised software life cycle ignoring iterations, deployment, maintenance and
decommissioning is described by DRD 920. Despite a few useful innovations, DRD 920 does
not materially differentiate itself from pre-existing standards (e.g. DO-178B).
3.6 UK CAA Air Traffic Management approach
The approach for safety assurance of Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems typically differs
from the approach for aircraft. For the latter, a single certification is done, after which all
aircraft of the same type are certified airworthy (in the country issuing the certificate). For
services provided by ground systems, typically the national regulator issues a license to operate
for a fixed period of time. After expiry of the license a periodic review is held and this license is
extended for the same time. Unfortunately for ATM systems, as discussed above, no standard is
(yet) internationally recognised. Even on a European level, harmonisation is not complete.
As the UK practise is advanced and informative, it is discussed below. The UK CAP-670
contains all safety-related regulations. The excerpt “Regulatory objective for software safety
assurance in air traffic service equipment” [SW01, 1998] focuses on software. The Standard
defines Assurance Evidence Levels (AEL), to identify the type, depth and strength of evidence
to be provided by the software development process to the assessor. In this way, the developer
may use any standard to provide the evidence. Based on the ESARR 4 safety classification (see
Table 3), one AEL is defined for each class. Three types of evidence are acknowledged: test,
field service and analytic. Every type of evidence can be either direct or backing, with
requirements provided for each type.
This goal-oriented approach is a more modern approach than that used with the other standards
discussed here. It means that the supplier has to provide the software classification, the type of
evidence that is needed, the evidence itself, and justification that the evidence is adequate. This
way of working would be more suitable for integrated systems like TALIS than the profusion of
the myriad standards currently available. This approach should be complemented by a mutual
recognition scheme, which means that approval in one country would be recognised by other
countries, preferably world wide, but at least within Europe. The merging of the authorities of
the European Union member states into the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is a step
in the right direction.
The [Commission on the future of the US aerospace industry, 2002] states that the current
product-based FAA certification process hampers innovation in several ways. It proposes to
shift from the current practises to an approach that fosters innovation to make aviation safer and
more secure. Such an approach would certify manufacturing organisations, who are then trusted
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to design and produce safe products, under what is called process certification. The FAA would
focus on the most critical safety aspects and safety oversight. The commission also states an
objective to reduce the aviation fatal accident rate by 90 percent by 2025. Given the lack of
evidence for the current safety requirements, a lot of standard innovation is needed to
accomplish these two objectives.
4 Other domain safety standards
The following overview of software safety standards from other domains is provided:
• To learn from their approach. Consequently this chapter will focus on the differences
• To assess COTS. For COTS to be viable the air transport market it too small. Both Boeing
and Airbus only produce a few hundred aircraft per year, with the number of processors
involved in safety critical tasks in the tens. Consequently for COTS to pay off, these
products should be deployable in other safety conscious markets as well.
4.1 Process industry IEC-61508
From the general software safety-critical domain [IEC-61508, 1998] is available which
originated in the process industry. Four Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) are defined. IEC-61508
states that safety can be quantified and assessed using reliability prediction techniques only for
hardware. For software, only qualitative techniques and judgements are possible. The Standard
explicitly states that failures rates lower then 10
-9
 per hour (i.e., level A according to DO-178B
or DO-278 AL1) can not be achieved for complex systems. Note that every programmable
system is considered complex. IEC-61508 defines its own software safety lifecycle, based on
the general V-model, described in many textbooks like [Broekman, 2003]. The IEC-61508 life
cycle does include operations, maintenance, repair, retrofit and even decommissioning
procedures, a useful extension to DO-178-B. The railway industry is converting to IEC-61508
by providing domain specific extensions to IEC-61508, in line with the intention of this
standard.
Part 7 of the standard aims to provide an exhaustive list of techniques for each process phase,
including recommendations on their use (or avoidance) for each SIL. This part of the standard
will need regular updates to remain in-line with information technology innovations. It is
possible to certify COTS for a certain level, when an IEC-61508 compliant development
process is followed. An independent party will perform the certification. Table 4 provides an
overview of the four SIL levels.
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Safety Integrity Level
(SIL)
Failure probability per hour
(systems active > once per year)
Failure probability per demand
(systems active < once per year)
4 10-9   ...  < 10-8 10-5  … < 10-4
3 10-8   ...  < 10-7 10-4  … < 10-3
2 10-7   ...  < 10-6 10-3  … < 10-2
1 10-6   ...  < 10-5 10-2  … < 10-1
Table 4: IEC-61508 Safety Integrity Levels
Using service experience is allowed, but in practice hardly possible for higher SIL levels. An
example from the standard states that for a SIL 1 system, 95% confidence in correct functioning
requires 300 hours of relevant service experience. For a SIL 4 system, 99.5 % confidence
requires 690 000 years of service experience.
4.2 Nuclear industry IEC-60880-2
In the nuclear industry [IEC-60880-2, 2000] is applicable. IEC-60880-2 is based on the software
classification provided in [IEC-61226, 1993], see table 5. The basic single-failure criterion
requires the assembly of safety systems to remain functional despite any random failure. This
single-failure criterion is not applicable for software, as a software failure can cause a system
with multiple hardware units to fail. As a consequence IEC-60880-2 devotes an appendix to the
pros and cons of multiple diverse software implementations. Multiple software versions can
only cover some fault classes, so incorrect or ambiguous specifications remain single point-of-
failure.
Category Description Excerpt assignment criteria
A Principal role in achieving safety • Mitigate to prevent significant sequence
• Failure could result in significant sequence
B Complementary role to category A • Control process variables within safety limits
• Alert staff of Category A failure
• Continuously monitor category A function
C Auxiliary or indirect role • Enhance category A performance
• Monitor and mitigate internal hazards an natural
events
• Ensure personnel safety
Unclassifie
d
No direct safety role • Not significant to safety
Table 5: IEC-61226 Overview
IEC-60880-2 distinguishes between software tools that can introduce errors and tools that fail to
detect them. The requirements for the former category are strict. Compilers (called translators)
are acknowledged to be too large to demonstrate their correctness. They are trusted under
certain restriction, unlike DO-178B where binary code needs to be verified for the highest level.
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The compiler may not introduce dead code, which is code that is not traceable to requirements
(e.g., error handling). Operating experience may compensate for some lack of design
documentation.
IEC-60880-2 allows for COTS. There are strict requirements on the evaluation of functions,
design documentation etc. In case operating experience is used, there are requirements on the
operating history data. Also after acceptance of the COTS, all subsequent error and failure
information has to be assessed for its potential impact on the approved system.
Unlike DO-178B, the evidence provided by formal methods is deservedly recognised.
4.3 Medical industry FDA-1252
For software in medical devices in the USA [FDA-1252, 1998] applies. The software is
classified into three “levels of concern,” see Table 6. FDA-1252 states that as the probability of
software failure cannot be measured, only the severity of the software failure consequences is
used to determine the level. A table listing 12 documents describes for each level of concern
what type of information is needed, if any. No specific software life-cycle model is prescribed,
but a general V-model for verification is provided. Verification needs to be performed at
module, integration and system levels.
Level of concern Severity description
Major Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly, to death or serious injury of
the patient and/or the operator
Moderate Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly, to non-serious injury of the
patient and/or the operator
Minor Software failures are not expected to cause injury to patient and/or operator
Table 6: FDA-1252 Level of concern
Even though FDA-1252 states that artificial neural networks are impossible to verify, they are
allowed for all levels of concern. Consequently the assumptions and the training of the neural
network need to be verified, but no guidance is provided.
According to FDA-1252, embedded and real-time systems pose unique concerns, but only the
use of techniques, simulators and emulators to analyse timing of critical events is mentioned,
but not imposed. The importance of human factors is acknowledged without enforcing
verification and validation requirements. In the same spirit, security is raised, but no
requirements ensue. Consequently the air transport domain can not learn much from FDA-1252.
However, in order for COTS to become commercially viable, COTS needs to be deployable in
various safety critical domains. This implies recognition of DO-178B by the medical domain
and a scaling of its levels to the FDA-1252 levels of concern.
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5 Security ISO-15408
After the tragic September 11 (2001) events security has become a major concern for air
transport. Especially network-enabled systems, like TALIS, are vulnerable to attacks hence need
protection. The trend to make systems network-enabled will also become relevant for the safety
critical systems in the other domains mentioned. This implies that standards are not only needed
for safety but also for security. The [ISO-15408, 1999] is an international standard which
includes security requirements and can provide certifications for complying products. ISO-
15408 is the civil variant of the Common Criteria (CC) from the military domain and will
follow all updates of the Common Criteria. As such it is discussed in this paper on standards.
The ISO-15408 aims to provide objective evidence about the product security level. Qualified
and officially recognised assessors perform the objective and repeatable evaluation, much like
DO-178B for safety certification. The evaluation can lead to a certificate, which is currently
recognised by 16 countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and twelve European
countries.
The ISO-15408 considers three security objectives aiming to prevent:
• Damaging disclosure of the service to unauthorised recipients (loss of confidentiality);
• Damage through unauthorised modification (loss of integrity);
• Damage through unauthorised deprivation of access to the asset (loss of availability).
Figure 5: Overview of security standard ISO-15408
Figure 5 provides an overview of the ISO-15408 view on the realisation of security functions.
The security environment provides the context of the asset. Combined with the perceived threats
and the security policy the security requirements can be derived. These requirements consist of
a reusable Protection Profile (PP) and an asset specific Security Target (ST). Based on these
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requirements and the extensive listing of possible security functions in the ISO-15408 Part 2,
the security functions of the system are determined. Separately the protection level is
determined, which determines the amount of implementation effort and evaluation effort.
Table 7 provides an overview of the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL). The amount of COTS
products in the register at the time of writing (August 2003) illustrates that ISO-15408 is rapidly
being accepted.
# of COTS productsEAL Description
Certified In evaluation
1 Functionally tested, security threats not serious 11 1
2 Structurally tested, low to moderate assurance 22 12
3 Methodically tested and checked, maximum assurance without
infringing sound development practise
17 2
4 Methodically designed, tested and reviewed, maximum
assurance compatible with good commercial practise
44 19
5 Semiformally designed and tested, maximum assurance with
moderate security engineering
1 0
6 Semiformally verified design and tested, protect high value
assets against significant risk
0 0
7 Formally verified design and tested, extremely high risk
situations and/or high assets values
0 0
Total # of COTS products 95 34
Table 7: ISO-15408 Evaluation Assurance Level
The ISO-15408 adds further requirements on the software development process, so
harmonisation with the safety requirements is advantageous.
Note that whereas DO-178B unjustifiably does not recognise the verification evidence from
formal methods, ISO-15408 requires it for the highest level. As air transport does not have a
tradition in software security certification, the industry can benefit of the military and
commercial domains through this more advanced standard. This would constitute innovation
through standardisation.
6 Conclusions
For air transport, safety is of prime concern. To demonstrate its safety, all systems need to
comply with the relevant safety standards.
For software this had led to a profusion of standards with different, sometimes even non-
compatible requirements. Those differences are hard to justify, as they derive from common
safety concerns. No standard is clearly superior. For integrated systems that have to rely on
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COTS, like TALIS, the current certification practise is hampering innovation hence
improvement is needed.
To improve software safety and its certification the following attributes are recommended for
inclusion in software safety standards and certification schemes:
• Certification is to be performed by an independent third party.
• A trusted party or organisation must accredit the independent third party.
• Certification should be performed in accordance with objective standards.
• There should be objective guidance for the reviewers. (e.g. like for DO-178B and the ISO-
15408)
• The standard should provide maximum freedom for the software processes being used and
the deployed techniques in order to exploit information technology innovation.
• The software cannot be tested to high levels of safety; instead many standards have to rely
on process requirements.
• The standard should allow a grading of software with sufficient nuances for less safety
critical applications.
• The standard should recognise COTS products. This should be done in a timely and cost
effective manner, to preserve the advantages of deploying COTS.
• As air transport has many integrated systems, inevitably the constituent parts will come
from various domains so there should be mutual recognition of the various
standards/certificates
• Research is needed on the effect of software safety requirements so that each requirement
can be justified for the intended safety level.
• The current state-of-the-art does not (yet) allow large systems (as used in air transport) to be
formally verified. For tractable subsystems, the evidence provided by formal methods
should be recognised.
• It would be convenient if software standards covering various non-related properties, like
safety and security, would impose compatible requirements.
Standard innovations like the goal-based approach, which states the objective, the evidence and
the reasoning seem to be beneficial if current safety standards are to be maintained or even
improved. This approach may comply with the objective of the US aerospace committee to shift
to a new software certification paradigm.
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8 Abbreviations
ACC Area Control Centre
ACL ATC Clearance and Information
ACM ATC Communications Management
AMC Airspace Management Cell
AOC Airline Operations Centre
APP Approach Control
ATC Air Traffic control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATSAW Air Traffic Situation(al) Awareness
AUTOPS Autonomous Flight Operations
CAP Controller Access Parameters
CFMU Central Flow Management Unit
CFR (US) Code of Federal Regulation
COSEP Co-operative Separation Assurance
COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf
COTRAC Common Trajectory Co-ordination
DCL Departure Clearance
DFIS Digital Flight Information
DSC Downstream Clearances
DYNAV Dynamic Route Availability
EAL Evaluation Assurance Levels
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EATMP European Air Traffic Management Programme
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System description
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ESA European Space Agency
ESARR EURCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Airworthiness Requirement
FLIPCY Flight Plan Consistency
FMP Flight Management Position
IFPS Initial Flight Plan Processing System
JAA Joint Aviation Authority
JAR Joint Aviation Requirement
MSAS MTSAT Satellite- based Augmentation System
PP Protection Profile
PPD Pilot Preferences Downlink
SAP System Access Parameters
ST Security Target
TALIS Total Information Sharing for Pilot Situational Awareness Enhanced by Intelligent
Systems
TWR Tower Control Service
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
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